Reverse logistics networks often consist of several tiers with independent members competing at each tier. This paper develops a methodology to examine the individual entity behavior in reverse production systems where every entity acts to maximize its own benefits. We consider two tiers in the network, collectors and processors. The collectors determine individual flow functions that relate the flow they provide each processor to the overall vector of prices that the processors determine. Because the exact final prices are unknown, each collector solves a robust optimization formulation where the prices paid by the processors are assumed to be within given ranges. The processors compete for the flow from the collectors until the Nash equilibrium is reached in this competitive tier, which sets the vector of prices to be offered to the collectors. To demonstrate the approach, a numerical example is given for a prototypical recycling network.
Introduction
Maximizing the efficiency of recycled material flows is growing in urgency due to high demands in many raw material markets and the increasing concern for environmental impact of disposal.
Supply chains are evolving from "open loop" unidirectional flows of materials, parts, and products from suppliers to end customers into more complex "closed loop" linked forward and reverse arcs (Fleischmann et al. 2000; Guide and Harrison 2003; Realff et al. 2004 ). Forward production systems are being expanded to incorporate reverse production systems (RPS) that include sorting, demanufacturing and/or refurbished processes in reverse logistics systems.
Most of the research on RPS design views the system in a centralized way; the key assumption is that one planner has the requisite information about all the participating entities and seeks the optimal solution for the entire system (see Ammons et al. 2001; Shih 2001; Barros et al. 1998; Assavapokee et al. 2005) . Wang et al. (2004) remark upon the three major drawbacks of centralized supply chain optimization models: (1) By ignoring the independence of the supply chain members, the competitive behavior between entities may lower the system efficiency and hence a centralized model may not capture the appropriate bargaining mechanisms that can mitigate the competitive behavior; (2) The cost of information processing may be expensive and the central decision maker must gather all the information from every entity; and (3) The computation of solutions to centralized optimization models can be very challenging.
Many emerging RPS structures consist of several independent entities where individual entrepreneurs have their own profit functions and often are unwilling to reveal their own information to each other or the public. This type of system behavior is decentralized. Often the decision variables for each entity in a decentralized system are also influenced by other entities' decisions, coupling prices between members of the same tier, and flows between supply chain tiers. In this paper, we focus on decentralized decision-making and protocol design for the RPS with two tiers. The two tiers represent the collectors, who interact directly with the source of recycled items, and the processors who purchase the items from the collectors and convert them into more fungible commodities that are sold to customers.
The Cournot-(see Hobbs 2001 ) and the Stackelberg-typed (Savaskan et al. 2004 ) models are two commonly used equilibrium models in decentralized systems. However, in practice the Cournot-typed model may incur information divulgence problems because it requires the collection of optimality conditions from different entities in order to establish the equilibrium solution. Conceptually, the solution procedure implies that entities need to pass the information of their optimality conditions to some invisible hand in the system, which requires the willingness to share information among participants with a centralized body in order to obtain the equilibrium solution. Furthermore, the Stackelberg-typed model (a leader-follower problem) may have implicit solution problems in a multiple-entity case since the leader considers the follower's optimal response to its decision under the Stackelberg model framework.
Technically, this means the leader substitutes the follower's optimal response function into its problem, and hence must have knowledge of it. This type of models is solved by the backward induction (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) . Nevertheless, an implicit solution may be reached in a multiple-entity case due to the property of substitution for optimal responses. We doubt whether the leader will have knowledge of the follower's optimal response in real-world decentralized systems. Instead, to avoid the problems of information divulgence and implicit solutions, we develop an explicit decision-making mechanism for calculating the optimal (self-interest) acquisition prices and the independent optimal flow determination for recycled materials in a decentralized RPS.
While forward and reverse supply chains share many similarities, there are significant differences. For forward supply chain systems, the material flow volumes are usually assumed to be functions of all prices in the final market (Nicholson 2002; Corbett and Karmarkar 2001) .
Once the historical data of demand and prices are available, the quantity and price relationship can be predicted since retailers face a considerable number of customers and perfect market assumptions are not unreasonable. However, for the RPS, the number of entities in the network is relatively small compared to a forward supply chain network. The relationship of the quantity and price in certain parts of the supply chain can not been derived due to the lack of data.
Instead, we present a robust approach to determine the relationship between the material flow volume and price between the collection and processing tier of the supply chain.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief literature review. In Section 3 we provide the formal definition of our two-tier problem: the upstream and downstream entities and their connection. In Section 4 and 5 we develop mathematical models for upstream and downstream entities to determine the price and flow decisions in a decentralized RPS. In Section 6 we summarize the solution algorithm for the upstream and downstream models. In Section 7, we apply the algorithm to a numerical example to determine the equilibrium product prices and resulting flows, and also provide a discussion of the model and results. Section 8 presents conclusions and also suggests directions for future research.
Literature Review
The past decade has seen an enormous increase in research on reverse logistics management issues. Flapper (1995 ), Fleishmann et al. (2000 , and Guide and Harrison (2003) give systematic overviews and challenges of the logistic aspects of reuse and recycling in closed-loop supply chains. Much of the research in RPS tends to be product, or system, specific due to the various features and complexities needed to handle the different recycling and reuse scenarios.
Research on recycling and resource recovery for specific materials such as paper, plastics and sand include Pohlen and Farris (1992) , Wang et al. (1995) , Huttunen (1996) and Barros et al. (1998) . Examples of product recovery and reuse include copy machines (Theirry et al. 1995; Theirry 1997; Krikke 1998) , computers and electronics equipment (Jayaraman et al. 1997; Hong et al. 2006) , and reusable transportation containers (Kroon and Vrijens 1995) . The basic underlying assumption in these papers is that the planning of reverse logistics operations is done by a single decision maker to optimize the total system performance.
There is a growing number of research papers on forward or reverse supply chains that model the independent decision-making process of each supply chain entity, specifically the interaction between pricing decisions and material flow volume transacted in the network. Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) examine the competition behavior between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the third-party local remanufacturer when the recycled products affect the demand of the original products. present an economic analysis for calculating the optimal acquisition prices and the optimal selling price for remanufactured products with different quality classes in one single remanufacturing firm. Savaskan et al. (2004) model three options for collecting used products, subcontracting with retailers, outsourcing to a third-party firm, and collecting by themselves, as decentralized decision-making systems with the manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader. Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) analyze different reverse channel designs of direct and indirect product collection systems where the manufacturer collects used products directly from the consumers or collects via retailers. The models presented in the above papers are limited in the number of supply chain entities and their coordination. Several researchers have presented competition models with the scope of multiple entities (Corbett and Karmarkar 2001; Nagurney and Toyasaki 2005) . Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) develop a model that considers entry decisions and post-entry competition in multitier serial supply chains. Nagurney and Toyasaki (2005) use a variational inequality solution approach to solve for the equilibrium network flow and endogenous prices of recycled materials. In this paper, instead, we consider a general RPS network structure with two tiers and multiple entities and propose an algorithm to solve independently for the explicit equilibrium acquisition prices and resulting network flows within the network. We take the perspective of decentralized decision-making analysis and protocol design for the collection and processing of recycled items which may be ultimately converted into used-products or raw materials demanded by several specific markets.
A Two-tier RPS Problem: Upstream and Downstream
A RPS to reuse or recycle end-of-life products is a network of transportation logistics and processing functions that collect, refurbish, and demanufacture. In general, several entities in different tiers compose a network of collection and processing steps, connected by a transportation logistics system. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume a basic RPS consisting of two tiers of multiple facilities, one collection and one processing, facing sources and demand markets. Material flow allocation and product acquisition are common challenges for the reverse logistics network, where the network may be geographically dispersed. Our experience with firms or non-profit recycling organizations in scrap electronics (e-scrap) reveals several specific questions that go beyond the current reverse logistics models either in the strategic or operational level.
• What is the end-of-life product transaction mechanism between collectors and processors when they negotiate the price-flow contract?
• How do the collectors allocate their collected items to the processors if both of them are run by independent individuals?
• How do the processors determine their price offers if they bid for the collected items from collectors? We first illustrate a two-tier network problem consisting of upstream and downstream tiers for a RPS depicted in Figure 1 . In general, the RPS is a network of several entities with functions that include collection and processing phases. The upstream tier represents the collection phase relating to sorting/consolidation processes and the downstream tier denotes the processing phase including refurbish/demanufacturing processes. Upstream entities collect endof-life items from the residential or business sectors, and then independent downstream entities bid exchange prices for collected items from upstream entities. Upstream entities usually collect in distinct market segments (business or residential) or distinct geographic locations. Thus, there is no competition among the upstream entities in our model. A successful upstream entity must carefully manage its material flow allocation of collected items, i.e., design an effective, fair and transparent price-flow contracts between itself and downstream entities, to pursue its self-interest and ensure it meets the demand for material. Independent downstream entities compete for collected items from upstream entities with other members in the downstream tier. There are several value-added refurbishing/demanufacturing processes involved in the downstream entities and items are transformed to refurbished items, subcomponents, or materials (e.g., used products, or raw materials) which are sold in several specific demand markets. An important issue for independent downstream entities is how to determine the optimal acquisition price which is used to acquire the items from upstream entities.
We focus on the transaction between upstream and downstream tiers on material flow allocation and associated price decisions. Upstream entities collect end-of-life products from residential or business sectors which may hold positive-or negative-value recycled items. In the e-scrap industry, residential or business sources may need to pay a collection fee to collectors for discarding the obsolete e-scrap items (Hong et al. 2006) . We assume the collection amount in upstream entities is a function of the collection fee that the upstream entity charges from end-oflife product sources: the higher the fee, the lower the potential amount collected from sources.
We let the source supply function denote this function. Downstream entities convert end-of-life products into several valuable raw materials and used products as well as trash after refurbish/demanufacturing processes. The transportation cost for the recycled item is paid by the downstream entity. The price the downstream entity pays for transportation will be taken into account by the upstream entity in flow allocation. In this paper, we specifically focus on the transaction of valuable items between upstream and downstream tiers and, as a result, we assume the acquisition prices to be offered by downstream entities are positive. We also argue that the amount of raw materials resulting from the decomposition of end-of-life products and used products is relatively small compared to the quantity in the virgin raw material and brand-new product markets. This observation leads to the assumption that the selling prices of raw materials or used products in demand markets are fixed amounts, not affected by the sales quantities.
We focus on two issues, the equilibrium acquisition prices to be offered by downstream entities, and the optimal price-flow contract between upstream and downstream tiers. The priceflow contract is a mechanism describing the correspondence between the acquisition prices offered by downstream entities and the flow amount supplied by the upstream entity to its subsequent downstream entities. The decision timeline for a two-tier problem is shown in Figure   2 We present our modeling for independent upstream and downstream entities in the following subsequent sections followed by the summary of the algorithm.
The Upstream Model: Price-Flow Contract
In this section, we present a robust optimization model for the independent upstream entity to determine the robust price-flow contract between upstream and downstream tiers. For simplicity, we refer to the price-flow contract as the flow function. We depict the upstream and downstream sites as nodes and the material flows as links in Figure 1 . Specifically, we consider m upstream sites who are involved in the collection of end-of-life products, which can then be acquired by n downstream sites. A typical upstream site is denoted by i, and a typical downstream site by j. We first discuss the robust approach and scenario setting in the upstream model followed by the description of flow functions determined by the independent upstream site and the upstream model itself.
The Robust Approach and Scenario Setting
The goal of the upstream model for any particular site i, i = 1, 2,…, m, is to design a "good" A particular price combination, 1 ( , , , , )
, of downstream entities refers to one scenario ω ∈Ω , where j P ω is the unit material price downstream site j willing to offer in price scenario ω . There are an infinite number of scenarios if the range of acquisition prices forecasted by the upstream entities fall in continuous compact intervals. In this paper we assume the price range is restricted to a finite number of discrete points for computational convenience.
A practical approach for computation is to select k points evenly in every dimension of the price range. Thus, the scenario space Ω considered is with n k scenarios if there are n downstream tier entities.
The objective of upstream entities is to construct a set of robust flow functions against the price ambiguity. In this paper we use the measure of robust deviation defined by (Kouvelis and Yu 1997) , such that each upstream site is to minimize the maximum difference between the best it can obtain when price offers from downstream sites are realized and the robust objective value under the designed flow function. This differs from a stochastic approach because each upstream entity is not required to assign a probability distribution over the acquisition prices, and it has practical benefits as the knowledge of acquisition prices is limited in a decentralized RPS.
This minimax optimization approach (Winston 1994 ) captures a notion of "risk" -the upstream site wants to protect itself from doing very poorly in a given price realization, which is unknown before contracting with the downstream tier.
The Price-Flow Contract: Flow Functions
A growing literature in operations management presents studies of supply chain contracting (see Tsay 1999; Donohue 2000; Cachon and Lariviere 2001; Corbett et al. 2004 ). These papers focus on the coordination between two parties of a upstream and a downstream entity (say a supplier and a buyer). In this paper, we present a general price-flow contract describing not only the coordination between tiers but also the competition within the tier. Intuitively the upstream entity tends to ship higher flow to the downstream entity who offers the higher acquisition price.
Obviously the price-flow contract from upstream sites to downstream sites are dependent of acquisition prices offered by downstream entities. Since the downstream tier entities pay the transportation costs, a downstream entity will prefer to acquire recycled items from a closer upstream entity and hence offer a proportionately higher price.
We let ( ) Tr ij V denote the unit transportation cost from site i to j. The unit reward that upstream site i receives from downstream site j is represented as the material price that the downstream entity is willing to offer while covering the associated unit transportation cost. Therefore, the unit reward of site i in price scenario ω is 
Potential Maximum Flow Determination
Upstream entities may determine different collection fees and collect different amounts from sources given different acquisition prices to be offered by downstream entities. Before 
where upstream site i picks the highest price offer from downstream sites as the selling price and the only unknown variable in (2) is the collection fee of ( ) Co i P ω that site i charged for the material from sources corresponding to price scenario ω .
For notation simplicity, we let (2) is maximized when the first-order condition holds, i.e., when 
The Robust Model for Upstream Sites
To execute the robust approach, first the optimal solution of each upstream site for each specified price scenario is found. This solution calculates the highest profit that the individual upstream site can obtain if it were to know the acquisition prices exactly. Then, we minimize the maximum deviation of the objective function value between the "ideal" and the "robust" sales profit for all price scenarios. Finally, we adjust the decision variables, ' s α , to ensure those returning the best sales profit for all tight and non-tight price scenarios. We let
O ω denote the optimal objective value of upstream site i for price scenario ω , and ( ) Tr ij C denote the shipment capacity between upstream site i and downstream site j. We assume that each upstream site i seeks to maximize the total profit associated with its collection and material allocation operations with the optimization problem given as follows for upstream site i for price scenario ω . 
Tr ij
The objective function (4) is the sum of the sales profits and collection fees. Constraints (5) are the material flow function definitions for emanating arcs from upstream site i. Constraints (6) and (7) provide capacity limits for each arc and for the recycled item source. Constraints (8), (9), and (10) are sign restrictions for unknown variables. Obviously, the material flow variables, ( ) Tr ij x ω , are nonnegative, and the sign restrictions for ' s α require that the upstream site has more incentive to ship more flow on the arc where its destination price offer is increased, but less incentive when other downstream sites offer higher prices competing the material flow.
Next, we determine the robust flow function, or a common set of coefficients, ' s α , to be evaluated in every price scenario ω ∈ Ω for site i. Thus, for each price scenario we subtract the robust objective function value ( i R ω ) using the common set of robust coefficients from the optimal objective value (
O ω ) of realization of acquisition price offers. The min-max robust optimization model over all price scenarios for upstream site i can be stated as:
Subject to:
The minimum maximum deviation Given the robust solution values for α , the upstream site models determine robust flow functions for each independent upstream site. Thus, the robust flow function describing the flow shipment from upstream site i to downstream site j, denoted by
where ' considering, the price-flow contract is found by setting the rest of the ' s α equal to zero in the upstream model. In the next section, we present downstream site models to solve for the equilibrium acquisition prices between these two tiers.
The Downstream Model: The Equilibrium Price
Downstream sites are involved in transactions with upstream sites and customers in final demand markets since they wish to obtain recycled items from upstream tier and sell the materials or subcomponents after refurbished/demanufacturing processes. Downstream sites make decisions on their own acquisition prices subject to their constraints of processing capacities, transportation capacities, and technology restrictions. We develop an equilibrium model of competitive downstream sites to determine the Nash equilibrium price where no downstream site can improve its objective function value by a unilateral change in its price solution. In this paper, we utilize the relaxation algorithm (see Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000; Contreras et al. 2004 ) to find the Nash equilibrium price solution.
The Optimization Model for the Downstream Site
The independent downstream site maximizes its objective function associated with the purchasing, processing cost and sales revenue and is subject to constraints imposed on the processing, transportation capacity, and demand restrictions. Required notation for the downstream model in addition to the upstream model notation is listed as follows. Using this notation, the optimization model for downstream site j can be stated as:
Variable restrictions
We assume that recycled items coming from different upstream sites are homogeneous. Thus, the total flows shipped to downstream site j, which is denoted by ( ) Tr j x , is the sum of flows from different upstream sites to downstream site j and is expressed as follows:
Here, the material flow variable for recycled items shipped to downstream site j,
x , is the function of acquisition prices of all downstream sites. Hence in order for the downstream site to compute its optimal price bid, it must know the bids of the other downstream sites, and only this.
The optimization model of (20) In the next section, we provide some concepts and the required notation for the illustration of the downstream site model algorithm.
Definitions and Concepts
There are j = 1,…, n downstream sites participating in competing the material flows with the price. Each downstream site j, j = 1,…, n, can adopt an individual price setting denoted by j j p P ∈ , where P j is the set of price actions that downstream site j can choose. All downstream entities, when acting together, can take a collective action, which is a vector
Denote the collective price action set by P, and, by definition,
be elements of the collective price action set 1 2
The following notation and terminology are based upon (Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000; Contrearas et al. 2004 ). Note that at the Nash equilibrium solution, no entity can improve its individual objective value by a unilateral change in its price decisions. In order to compute the Nash equilibrium, we introduce the Nikaido-Isoda function (Nidaido and Isoda 1955) . This function transforms an equilibrium problem into an optimization problem (Contreras et al. 2004 ). The Nikaido-Isoda
Each summand of the Nikaido-Isoda function can be viewed as the change in the objective function value when its price action changes from p j to q j for all sites j in the downstream tier, while all other downstream sites continue to choose according to price vector p. This means that one entity changes its price action while others do not. Thus, the function represents the sum of these changes in objective functions. Krawczyk and Uryasev (2000) claim that the function is non-positive for all feasible q when p * is a Nash equilibrium solution, since no entity can improve its objective function value at equilibrium by unilaterally alternating its solution. This observation is used to construct a termination condition for the relaxation algorithm, such that when an ε is chosen, the Nash equilibrium is obtained when max ( , )
, where s is the iterative step of the relaxation algorithm.
Finally we introduce the optimum response function which returns the set of downstream entities' price actions whereby they all try to unilaterally maximize their respective objective function values. The optimum response function (Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000) at the price vector p is expressed in (25).
Next, we illustrate the relaxation algorithm to solve for the Nash Equilibrium acquisition prices between upstream and downstream tiers.
The Relaxation Algorithm
The relaxation algorithms are used by (Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000; Contreras et al. 2004 ) for different applications. We apply the relaxation algorithm to iteratively search for the Nash equilibrium acquisition price solution of downstream site models. At each iteration of the algorithm, downstream sites wish to move to a price point that represents an improvement on the current price point. Having an initial estimate price vector, p 0 , the relaxation algorithm is shown as follows:
where 0 By taking a sufficient number of iterations, the algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium price p * with a specified precision.
It is also interesting to note that the concept of the algorithm itself matches the idea of a decentralized view on downstream sites. In each iteration, every entity can access all entities' previous price actions and determines its best move in price decision based on its own interests and constraints. In other words, the problem is a calculation of the succession of price decisions, where entities choose their optimum response given the price decisions of the competitors in the previous iteration.
The following theorem states the conditions of existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution and the convergence of the relaxation algorithm. Our optimization downstream models satisfy these conditions, which is proven in Corollary 1. First we state required definitions as follows (see Contreras and Krawczyk 2004) . Let : P P Ψ × →ℜ be a function defined on a product P P × , where P is a convex closed subset of the Euclidean space n ℜ . Further, we consider that ( , ) Ψ p q is weakly convex-concave if it satisfies the following inequalities. In other words, a function Ψ of two vector arguments is referred to as weakly convexconcave if it satisfies weak convexity with respect to its first argument and weak concavity with respect to its second argument. The notions of weak convexity and concavity are relaxations of strict convexity and concavity (Berridge and Krawczyk 1997) . The residual terms, to be chosen at will, ensure that there are many concave functions which are weakly convex and many convex functions which are weakly concave.
Theorem 1 (Uryasev and Rubinstein 1994) There exists a unique Nash equilibrium point to which the relaxation algorithm converges if :
(1) P is a convex compact subset of
the Nikaido-Isoda function : P P Ψ × →ℜ is a weakly convex-concave function and ( , ) 0
the optimum response function ( ) Z p is single-valued and continuous on P,
the residual term ( r z x, y) is uniformly continuous on P with respect to z for all P ∈ x, y , Corollary 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium price solution for downstream sites to which the relaxation algorithm converges.
Proof. We need to verify that our downstream models satisfy the conditions (1) to (6) in Theorem 1.
Condition (1): it is trivially satisfied.
Condition (2): from (23), we have that the material flows shipped to downstream site j, j = 1,…,n, is expressed as
. After algebra manipulations, the objective function of downstream site j is simply expressed in (27), where V j is a constant parameter for downstream site j.
For any solution
Condition ( (Uryasev 1988) . The residual term of ( r z p,q) is a polynomial expression which is continuous on P. Furthermore, ( r z p,q) is uniformly continuous on P since P is compact (Bartle 1976) .
Condition (5): assuming that ( , Ψ p q) is twice continuously differentiable, in order to prove this condition, it suffices to show that
is positive definite (Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000) , where 
( , | 
As discussed in Proposition 1, we require that is positive definite (Strang 1986 ). We can conclude that the optimization models of downstream sites satisfy Condition (5).
Condition (6): in order for the algorithm to converge, we may choose any sequence ( s β )
satisfying the Condition (6) 
The Summary of the Solution Algorithm
The overall reverse production system is comprised of four entities: sources, collectors, processors and customers as shown in Figure 3 . The material flows are represented as solid lines, information communication is denoted by the dashed line, and the steps of the solution algorithm are illustrated by the number in the rectangle box in Figure 3 . The behavior of the source and the customer is assumed simple. The source supplies the collector on the basis of a fee charged by the collector, and the relationship is known by both parties. We assume that this is linear in the fee, with a decreasing flow for a higher collection fee. The source can be thought of as the aggregate behavior of many independent entities that have a given product ready for disposal that will choose to go, or not to go, to a collector based on the fee. The customers have a fixed price for a given material or sub-component and the market is assumed to be very large such that the flow from processors to customers does not change the price. The customers communicate the price to the processors at the outset, but it is not considered private information. In the next section, we apply the upstream and downstream models to an example to generate the flow functions as well as the equilibrium acquisition price between upstream and downstream tiers. Then, we obtain the corresponding material flows between collectors and processors and equilibrium collection fees of the collectors.
A Numerical Example
This example, depicted in Figure 4 , illustrates the application of the above upstream and downstream models. There are three collection sites, i = 1, 2, 3, in the upstream tier and three processing sites, j = 1, 2, 3, in the downstream tier. The collection sites collect end-of-life products from sources and ship them to processing sites. The transportation costs per unit flow between collection and processing sites are given in Table 1 .
Processing Sites The corresponding material flows between collection and processing sites and equilibrium collection fees of collection sites are listed in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. The preceding example demonstrates a two-tier and single-commodity decentralized RPS problem that can be solved using the models given in Section 4 and 5. First, the upstream model for each collection site provides the flow functions used to contract with processing sites. Then, we solve for the Nash equilibrium acquisition prices between collection and processing sites by the relaxation algorithm. Finally, we obtain the corresponding material flows between these two tiers and the equilibrium collection fees of collection sites.
Conclusions and Extensions
This paper presents a decentralized perspective for reverse production systems where each independent entity considers its own objective function and is subject to its own constraints.
Meanwhile, the objective function of each entity not only depends on its own decision variables but also depends on decision variables of other entities. In this paper, we focus on a two-tier reverse production system involving the price and material flow decisions where the price-flow contract is determined by upstream entities and the acquisition prices of material flows transacted between upstream and downstream sites are determined by downstream entities. We apply the min-max robust optimization on each of the independent upstream models to generate the flow functions which are used to contract with downstream sites.
Downstream entities compete for material flows from the upstream tier. The iterated relaxation algorithm is used to solve for the Nash equilibrium acquisition prices between upstream and downstream sites. Note that the algorithm itself matches the idea of a decentralized decision-making process where every downstream entity can access all entities' previous price actions and determines its next best move for its price decision. We also show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium price under reasonable assumptions about the underlying functions of each entity. Then, the equilibrium acquisition prices from downstream entities are communicated to associated upstream entities, who then determine the flows to the downstream entities and the collection fees to acquire recycled items.
In this paper, upstream entities determine price-flow contracts by using a robust optimization approach, but there are other criteria, such as an expected value and a max-min objective, that may be used by different upstream entities. Also, many reverse production systems have network structures that involve more than the two types of entities we have discussed here, and with more than one type of item to be picked up and recycled. For example, computers, printers, monitors and other auxiliary equipment are available from sources and may be converted into commodities such as steel and copper through a supply chain that involves multiple processors engaged in size reduction and smelting. The extension of our approach to these multi-tier problems with multiple item types requires further refinement of the models we have developed.
Finally, the reverse supply chains differ general forward chains in that, in the former, the government may involve more with policy making or evaluation. The model presented in this paper is a prototype decentralized RPS model and can be used as a tool to analyze the issues of the government-subsidy, price fluctuation, comparison of centralized vs. decentralized systems, and other situations where the individual behavior of the supply chain components might be an important overall factor in the system behavior.
